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I.
Case Background |
I. CASE BACKGROUND
The President of Haiti (Jean-Bertrand Aristide) was democratically elected on December 16, 1990. However, on September 30, 1991, he was overthrown in a coup d'etat headed by Lieutenant-General Raoul Cedras.(1) As a result of the coup, Raoul Cedras's junta was immediately and strongly condemned by the United Nations (U.N.), Organization of American States (O.A.S.), and United States (U.S.). These three entities later reacted with sanctioning Cedras's action. (Sanctions on Haiti were in place from late 1990 to late 1994, when Aristide was reinstated as President of Haiti.) Nonetheless, it was U.S. military pressure, rather than U.N., O.A.S., and U.S. sanctions that deposed Raoul Cedras. Sanctions on Haiti seemed to fail outright: Haiti's environment was effected deleteriously; due to a lack of staple goods, Haiti's poor suffered; and Rauol Cedras's control over Haiti was strengthened, rather than weakened. With the failure of sanctions, one must ask: Why did the sanctions fail so miserably? This case examines the reasons for their failure.
2. Description After Raoul Cedras's junta overthrew Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 1990, the O.A.S., U.N., and U.S. began to sanction their actions, thereby, sanctioning Haiti as a whole. Sanctions were in place from 1990 to 1994, when Aristide was reinstated as President of Haiti.(2) The proceeding is a time line of O.A.S., U.N., and U.S. actions taken against Cedras's regime. TIME LINE OF O.A.S., U.N., AND U.S. ACTIONS TAKEN DURING THE COUP *In reaction to Raoul Cedras's overthrow of Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the O.A.S. Ministers for Foreign Affairs on October 3, 1990, adopted a resolution demanding Aristide's immediate reinstatement. In the resolution, the Ministers recommended the diplomatic, economic, and financial isolation of Cedras and his cadres. They also recommended the suspension of any aid except that provided for humanitarian purposes. In accordance with this resolution, the O.A.S. dispatched a mission to Haiti. At which time, they urged the United Nations to consider the spirit and aims of this resolution.(3) *The United Nations General Assembly (hereafter U.N.G.A.) adopted Resolution 46/7 on October 11, 1990. The Resolution condemned the illegal replacement of Haiti's constitutionally elected President, the use of violence and military coercion, and the violation of human rights. Moreover, the Resolution affirmed as unacceptable any entity resulting from the coup d'etat. Furthermore, 46/7 demanded the immediate restoration of the legitimate Government of President Aristide, the application of the Haitian Constitution, and full observance of human rights in Haiti.(4) *The U.N. Security Council (hereafter U.N.S.C.) on June 1993, acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, adopted Resolution 841. This resolution both imposed an arms and oil embargo on Haiti and froze Haitian government funds invested abroad. Exceptions were made for petroleum products (including propane gas to be used for cooking "non-commercial quantities" of food) and for "verified humanitarian needs." The effective monitoring of delivery and use of these goods was established " by a U.N. Sanctions Committee. Within 841, the U.N.S.C. also appealed to Member States to take whatever measures they needed to take in order to support the O.A.S. resolutions. (5) *On July 3, 1993, President Aristide and General Cedras signed the Governors Island Agreement. Under the Agreement, President Aristide was to return to Haiti by October 30, 1993, and the leadership of the Haitian police and military were to retire. The Agreement also called for the United Nations to assist in modernizing the Haitian armed forces and establishing a new Haitian police force. According to the Agreement, the United Nations Security Council on September 23 would authorize the establishment and dispatch of a United Nations Mission in Haiti (U.N.M.I.H.).(6) *As a result of violence that broke out on October 11, the U.N. Security Council decided to reimpose sanctions on October 13 in Resolution 873. On October 14, President Aristide's Minister of Justice was assassinated in Port-au-Prince.(7) *The U.N.S.C. on May 6, 1994 in Resolution 917 tightened sanctions with a general trade embargo and a ban on air traffic. (The ban on air traffic did not effect commercial flights.) 917's ban on air traffic, restricted the travel of senior Haitian military and police officers and their families and associates: approximately 600 people. In addition, the Resolution called on all states to freeze the assets of these individuals.(8) *In late September 1994, 16,000 troops, most of them from the U.S., moved into Haiti. Whereby, they reinstated President Aristide and escorted the coup leaders out of the country. (10) With sanctions in place, they dramatically effected Haiti's ability to trade, Haiti's environment, and Haitian's human rights. EFFECTS OF THE EMBARGO ON TRADE Since the embargoes beginning, 60% of Haiti's private sector jobs have been lost; because there are approximately six dependents per job holder, the losses directly affected nearly 1 million people.(12). The impact of the embargo on the business environment will have negative long term repercussions, e.g., Haiti's export assembly industry has been effectively shut down, with many of its plants closing permanently.(13) Although the sanctions were aimed at usurping Cedras and his junta's power, the Cedras regime found ways to circumvent sanctions. In circumscribing sanctions, Cedras's regime was able to profit from the crippled Haitian economy. With a tight control on the supply and distribution of goods smuggled into the country, the regime was able to arbitrarily determine their levels of profit. In addition to benefitting Cedras's regime, sanctions benefitted other dubious characters, such as drugtraffikers and corrupt Dominican Republic military officials who used the sanctions porosity to make a handsome profit. EFFECTS OF THE EMBARGO ON THE ENVIRONMENT The embargo produced worsening health conditions and accelerated environmental degradation throughout Haiti. The blocked shipments of fuel led to increased deforestation and soil erosion, as many people were forced to burn scarce wood and charcoal for cooking. With deforestation and soil erosion, Haiti's bio-diversity has been effected adversely. Plants that rely upon Haiti's soil, replete in nutrients, are put at risk of depletion; animals that rely upon the plants for food are put at risk of extinction. Ergo, the deforestation and soil erosion, caused by the clear cutting of forests in Haiti, could cause a vicious cycle of environmental destruction. The fuel shortage also undermined the capacity of Haitians to feed themselves. Without fuel, agricultural equipment could not operate and crops neither could be planted nor harvested. Water needed for irrigating fields was diverted to provide Port-au-Prince with hydroelectric power. With water diverted to Port-au-Prince, Haiti's bio-diversity (in the future) is likely to be effected--the effects of which can not, as of yet, be determined. In addition to not being properly irrigated and managed, the agricultural sector has been harmed by the scarcity of pesticides and fertilizers the sanctions caused in Haiti. EFFECTS OF THE EMBARGO ON HUMAN RIGHTS The sanctions have led to a dramatic drop in Haitians living standards. As a result, many Haitian's have had to adopt harsh survival tactics, such as foraging for plants and eating seeds of crop plants, led to a surge of illnesses in the poorest areas of Haiti. For example, the sanctions contributed to extensive malnutrition, disease, and famine in the northwest. Unfortunately, in rural areas scarcity of transportation and lack of electricity has led to deaths: deaths which could have been otherwise prevented. The deaths occurred, because with a lack of electricity or transportation, vaccines could not be adequately refrigerated or shipped.(14) Those most effected by sanctions were children. Aid workers say children's death rates, because of the sanctions, were 20 times the usual rate. The children died from treatable maladies, such as measles and other commonly treatable viruses. This was because sanctions forced Haitian public-health programs to grind to a halt.(15) THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SANCTIONS ON HAITI The U.N., O.A.S., and U.S.'s embargoes--especially the U.S. embargoes which restricted transhipment of all goods--caused a shortage of goods in Haiti's market and subsequently led to malnourishment and increased rates of death, especially among children. Also, the sanctions degraded Haiti's environment. Nonetheless, the human suffering sanctions caused were supposed to lead to Cedras' overthrow. As sanction theory goes, the more suffering those opposed to the regime in power have to endure, the more likely they are to attempt coups against that regime. The problem with sanctions on Haiti is that this scenario did not occur: opposition forces did not attempt overthrow Raoul Cedras. In fact, sanctions made opposition forces weaker and Cedras' regime stronger. Cedras' regime had monopolistic control over both Haiti's supply of food and fuel. With a tight control over these essentials, opposition forces were beholden to Cedras' regime. (19) As a result of economic hardships, the embargo generated a flood of desperate Haitians fleeing the island of Hispaniola (more than 40,000). Nevertheless, U.S. policy toward the refugees was harsh. Of the estimated 38,000 refugees processed since the beginning of the coup by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service at Guantanamo Bay, 27,000 were forcibly repatriated. The U.S. forcibly repatriated Haitians, albeit Haitians upon repatriation faced persecution, arrests, beatings, torture, and other human rights abuses. The U.S. State Department denied the validity of such claims of human rights violations. Although the U.S. State Department denied the existence of such violations, Amnesty International documented multiple cases of arbitrary killings, arrests, and other abuses linked to the military since the coup. Furthermore, Amnesty International's U.S. deputy director reported a dramatic increase in repression in April 1992.(16) In addition to Amnesty International's evidence, a report, which concurred with Amnesty's findings, was released in September 1992 by the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights. Their report went on to say that "...the human rights situation in Haiti was worse than, at any time, since the Duvalier era."(17) The increasing flow of Haitian refugees (more than 10,000 in May 1992 alone) prompted the Bush administration to qualify the situation as "unmanageable" and to introduce on May 24 a policy that effectively prevented Haitian immigration.(18) Pursuant to the Presidential directive, the U.S. Coast Guard intercepted refugees and turned them back to Haiti, without allowing hearings for asylum claims. The legality of Washington's restrictive immigration policy is dubious at best. The Bush administration argued that because the U.S. Coast Guard was operating outside U.S. territory, the United States was not bound by U.S. law--U.S. law prohibits the return of political refugees. Furthermore, the Bush administration attempted to justify their actions by saying the Haitian's were economic refugees, not political refugees; therefore, political asylum would not apply in their instances. The impact of the sanctions were direct, because they directly impacted Haiti's lower and middle classes. Within Haiti, the O.A.S. and U.N. oil embargoes contributed to the impoverishment of everyone except the "elite." Because oil was a contraband, its price was inflated above the spot market rate. The "elite" were able to purchase oil at inflated prices, while the "poor" were unable to meet this price. Making the problem worse was oil's inflated price. Its inflated price caused an increase in other goods' prices, e.g. domestic agricultural products. Haitian grown produce was more expensive because it was less abundant; it was scarce because oil is needed to operate farm machinery. Thus, due to oil's rampant inflation, it can be said that the prices of some goods--which were highly dependent upon the cost of oil--skyrocketed. In addition to increasing petrol prices, the diverting of water to Port-Au Prince and shortages of pesticides and fertilizers adversely effected the supply of agricultural goods, ergo, their prices. In addition to the O.A.S. and U.N. embargoes on oil, the May 17, 1992 O.A.S. Resolution on Restoration of Democracy in Haiti also contributed to scarcity in the market. The resolution "urged . . . member states to adopt whatever actions may be necessary for the greatest effectiveness of sanctions, including denying port facilities to vessels trading with Haiti."(22) As a result of the O.A.S. Resolution, the President of the United States on May 28, 1992, directed the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of Transportation "to deny the use of American ports to ships that violate the trade embargo against Haiti." The U.S. Government's action was detrimental to Haiti because of Haiti's overwhelming dependence on U.S. imports (70%).(23) A decrease in U.S. imports then led to inflationary prices: prices the poor could not absorb. When it was all said and done, Haiti's poor were hit with a triple whammy: U.N., U.S., and O.A.S. prohibitions. With the impoverishment of the poor, Raoul Cedras and his regime were able to stay in power. Unlike the F.R.Y., Haiti's economic disintegration did not cause a sense of community and solidarity in the country as a whole. Although Cedras was unable to create a sense of community within the entire populous of Haiti, he did create a sense of solidarity within the elite. And with the solidarity of the elite, the junta's repression of liberals and moderates became more intense, thereby allowing the Haitian military's hold on the country to strengthen. Haiti has always experienced a current account deficit, however, that deficit seemed to worsen after sanctions were put in place. The following chart shows the drop in Haiti's current account deficit. (This most likely resulted from its tremendous drop in exports.)
Continent: North America
Region: Southern North America and Caribbean
Country: Haitio
II. Environment Aspects
III. Conflict Aspects
IV. Environment and Conflict Overlap
The embargo produced accelerated environmental degradation throughout Haiti. The blocked shipments of imported fuel led to increased deforestation and soil erosion. With petrol imports sanctioned, Haitian's gathered wood to use as a substitute for petrol. Along with the clearcutting of forests and subsequent soil erosion clearcutting caused, the diversion of Haiti's water sources to Port-au-Prince may cause environmental devastation in the future. Because of the diversion of water, Haiti's bio-diversity is likely to be effected--the effects of which can not, as of yet, be determined. Because the embargo on Haiti blocked the imports of petroleum, Haitian's began burning coal and trees for fuel. The lumber for fuel was gathered through clear cutting methods; the clear cutting of forests led to deforestation and soil erosion. With deforestation and soil erosion, Haiti's bio-diversity was adversely effected. Plants that rely upon Haiti's soil, replete in nutrients, are put at risk of depletion; animals that rely upon the plants for food are put at risk of extinction. As a result, the use of these substitutes led to the devistation of Haiti's eco-system.
V. Related Information and Sources
"Attaining Democracy: 'A Lengthy and Difficult Task': Sanctions", U.N. Chronicle, vol. 30, Dec. 1993. Baker, James A. III, Address before the O.A.S., U.S. Department of State Dispatch, October 7, 1991, p. 749. Barber, James, "Economic Sanctions as a Policy Instrument", International Affairs, vol. 33,4 Autumn 1979. Caldwell, Christopher, "Airistide Development," American Spectator, July 1994, v27n7, p. 32-41. "The Canadian Forces Contribution to Peace in Haiti," Op Pivot Home Page, Col. Matthew's Introduction to CCUNMIH, Canadian Utility Helicopter Squadron, Canadian Airfield Engineering Squadron, Canadian Museum Transport Flight, National Support Squadron. Canute, James, "Haiti: A Theatre of the Absurd," Financial Times, March 10, 1992, p. 7. "Cedras Thumbs His Nose," The Economist, November 6, 1993. Clifford Chance Home Page, November 6 1993. Continuation of National Emergency with Respect to Haiti: Communication from The President of The United States, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, November 1993. "Cuba and Haiti: Worlds Apart," The Economist, June 26, 1993. French, Howard W., "Land and Health Also Erode in Haiti,"New York Times, January 28,1992. _____, "Doubting Sanctions, Airistide Urges U.S. Action on Haiti," New York Times, June 3 1994. _____, "Embargo Seen as Insufficient for the Return of Airistide", The New York Times, May 3, 1993. _____, "Tension is Rising as Haiti Military Tightens Grip", The New York Times, October, 17, 1993. "Haiti Cracking Down," The Economist June 19, 1993. "Haiti: Punishing Victims," The Economist, February 8. Hockstader, Lee, "Embargo Translates into Ecological Disaster for Haiti," Washington Post, May 31, 1992, p. A1. ________, "For Haiti's Rulers, a Key Signal," Washington Post, February 5, 1992, p. A26. Holmes, Steven A., "US and UN Tell Haiti Military to Cooperate", The New York Times, October 12, 1993. Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, Schott, Jeffery J., and Ellitot, Kimberly Ann, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy, Washington: International Institute of Economics, 1985. Hufbauer, Gary, "The Futility of Sanctions", The Wall Street Journal, June 1, 1994. Huntington, Samuel P., The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991. Manning, Bayless, "Congress, Executive, and Intermestic Affairs", Foreign Affairs, January 1977. O.A.S. Resolution On Restoration Of Democracy In Haiti (May 17, 1991), Foreign Policy Bulletin, July/August 1991. President's Statement on Follow-up To the May 17, 1991 O.A.S. Resolution On Haiti, Foreign Policy Bulletin, July/August 1991. "Report Decries Haitian Abuses, U.S. Policies," Washington Post, August 21. Smolje, Jill, "Shadow Play," Time, May 23, 1994 Volume 143, No. 21. Sorenson, Georg, Democracy and Democratization: Dilemmas in World Politics, Boulder, CO: Westview Press Inc., 1993. Spero, Joan Edelman, The Politics of International Economic Sanctions, 4th edition, New York, St. Martins Press, 1990. "The United Nations and the Situation in Haiti," The United Nations Department of Public Information, November 30, 1994 U.N. Security Council Resolution 706 of August 15, 1991, Foreign Policy Bulletin, November/December, 1991. U.S. Department of State Dispatch, Albright, Madeline K., "Reinforcing Haitian Democracy," October 17, 1994. U.S. Department of State Dispatch, Clinton, William J., Albright, Madeline K., and Gray William, "U.S. Taking New Steps to Respond to Crisis in Haiti," May 23, 1994. U.S. Department of State Dispatch, Talbott, Strobe, "Pursuing the Restoration of Democracy in Haiti," May 23, 1994. U.S. Department of State Dispatch, Talbott, Strobe, "Update on the four point plan for Haiti," June 13, 1994. Vasquez, Ian, "Doing What We Can For Haiti," Policy Analysis No. 183, Cato Institute, November 5, 1992. Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Clinton, William J., "Letter to Congressional leaders on Haiti," October 17, 1994. Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, "Remarks Announcing William H. Gray as Special Adviser on Haiti and an Exchange with Reporters," May 16, 1994. Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Clinton, William J., "Executive Order 12853--Blocking government of Haiti Property and Prohibiting Transactions with Haiti," July 5, 1993. 29. ENDNOTES (1) "The United Nations and the Situation in Haiti," The United Nations Department of Public Information, November 30, 1994. (2) "The Canadian Forces Contribution to Peace in Haiti," Op Pivot Home Page, Col. Matthew's Introduction to CCUNMIH, Canadian Utility Helicopter Squadron, Canadian Airfield Engineering Squadron, Canadian Museum Transport Flight, National Support Squadron. (3) "Attaining Democracy: 'A Lengthy and Difficult Task': Sanctions", UN Chronicle, vol. 30, Dec. 1993. (4) Ibid. (5) Vasquez, Ian, "Doing What We Can For Haiti," Policy Analysis No. 183, Cato Institute, November 5, 1992. (6) "Attaining Democracy...." (7) Opsit. (8) Ibid. (9) Ibid. (10) "The United Nations and the Situation...." (11) Vasquez, Ian. (12) Ibid. (13) "Haiti: Punishing Victims," The Economist, February 8,1992, p. 36. (14) Lee Hockstader, "For Haiti's Rulers, a Key Signal," Washington Post, February 5, 1992, p. A26. (15) "Cedras Thumbs His Nose," The Economist, November 6, 1993. (16) Canute James, "Haiti: A Theater of the Absurd," Financial Times, March 10, 1992, p. 7. (17) Howard W. French, "Land and Health Also Erode in Haiti,"New York Times, January 28, 1992, p. A3; and Lee Hockstader, "Embargo Translates into Ecological Disaster for Haiti," Washington Post, May 31, 1992, p. A1. (18) "Report Decries Haitian Abuses, U.S. Policies," Washington Post, August 21, (19) Smolje, Jill, "Shadow Play," Time, May 23, 1994 Volume 143, No. 21. (20) Huntington, Samuel P., The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991. (21) Sorenson, Georg, Democracy and Democratization: Dilemmas in World Politics, Boulder, CO: Westview Press Inc., 1993. (22) OAS Resolution On Restoration Of Democracy In Haiti (May 17, 1991), Foreign Policy Bulletin, July/August 1991. (23) President's Statement on Follow-up To the May 17, 1991 O.A.S. Resolution On Haiti, Foreign Policy Bulletin, July/August 1991. (24) "Haiti Cracking Down," The Economist June 19, 1993. (25) French, Howard W., "Embargo Seen as Insufficient for the Return of Airistide", The New York Times, May 3, 1993. (26) "Attaining Democracy: 'A Lengthy and Difficult Task': Sanctions", U.N. Chronicle, vol. 30, Dec. 1993.