ICE Case Study

Chemical Weapons Disposal Dispute



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Case Number: 19

Case Mnemonic: JOHNS

Case Name: Johnston Atoll Chemical Waste

Draft Author: May, 1997

I. CASE BACKGROUND

1. Abstract

Arms control experts and environmentalists alike agreed with the proposition that there should be disarmament by both the United States and the nations of the former Soviet Union. However, a rift emerged between these two otherwise allied constituencies. Greenpeace International has attempted to interrupt the "demilitarization" of chemical and biological weapons formerly held by these two superpowers. Their objection rests on the dangerous transport and incineration of these biological and chemical agents at the Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System (JACADS) site. Greenpeace demanded that these weapons be disposed of in such a way as to prevent the release of any material whatsoever back into the environment. Disposal experts reject this notion, calling it an absurdity in its conception, and instead argue that Greenpeace's objection makes a mockery of the agreement the United States and the Soviet Union reached regarding the decommissioning of theses weapons. Arms control experts also suggest that by questioning the agreement, other countries with the ability to produce and house chemical weapons will see the accord as merely a sham.

Greenpeace International is not the one questioning the manner in which the United States intends to dispose of these weapons. America Samoa, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Cook Islands, New Zealand, the government of Hawaii and other public interest groups have all denounced not only the Army's plans to incinerate the chemical agents but also what they perceive to be a dangerous ocean voyage to transport the agents to the Johnston facility.

2. Description

The first systematic effort , in modern times, to use poison on the battlefield occurred during World War I. On April 22nd, 1915, German soldiers released 6,000 canisters of chlorine gas and killed 5,000 French and Algerian soldiers. By the end of the war, more than 90,000 casualties were a direct result of poison gas released. The horror of gas warfare persuaded most of the world's nations to adopt the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which first outlawed the usage of chemical weapons.

During World War II, both the Axis and Allied powers were poised to use the chemical weapons at their disposal but neither initiated its usage and the world was spared the horror experienced during World War I. Nevertheless, the production of chemical weapons continued after the second world war. By the mid 1980s, the United States arsenal contained millions of weapons and a total of approximately 30,000 tons of chemical agents. The Soviet arsenal, though, was even larger. Their stockpile contained more than 40,000 tons of chemical agents with unknown amounts of weapons.

In June 1990, the Soviets and the Americans reached an agreement concerning the disposal of their vast arsenals of chemical weapons. The accord committed both the United States and the Soviet Union to verify - by on-site inspection - the destruction of their stockpiles down to 5,000 agent tons. Following the bilateral U.S.-Soviet accord reached in 1990, a Chemical Weapons Convention was convened, chartered and signed by 137 nations in mid-February 1993. It essentially bans the development, production, stockpiling, transfer and use of chemical weapons, including the use of tear gas "as a method of warfare". Signatories must destroy chemical weapon facilities and stockpiles, including those that have abandoned on another state's territory.

Russia's difficulties in planning, funding and executing a destruction program have forced the time lines for this bilateral accord to slip closer to the Chemical Weapon Convention's 10-year destruction schedule, which would culminate in 2005. Unfortunately, this is not the only problem faced by the signatories of both the bilateral accord and the international accord.

The United States is being counted on to develop the most technically advanced and environmentally friendly destruction process so that other nations may pattern their destruction facilities after ours. The Johnston facility on Johnston Atoll is the pilot upon which the U.S. government hopes to pattern other decommissioning plants. The Johnston facility, though, has not only run into technical difficulties, increasing costs, and set- backs; but it has generated protests from public interest groups, environmental groups and other governments concerning the potential dangers that chemical weapons represent.

Protest groups have organized against the government's method of decommissioning, the international oceanic transfer of waste, the increasing costs that both incineration and adherence to international conventions has come to represent, and the destruction of the remainder of weapons in the continental United States if and when the pilot plant at Johnston Atoll has proven to be successful.

Although the main focus of this case study is on the site of the Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System, the trans- shipment of chemical weapons held in Germany and other sites exposes other areas to the potential dangers of a chemical weapons leak or accident. This potentially places the entire globe at risk since the routes taken by Army vessels carrying these weapons varies and are highly secretive. The Army maintains tight security to reduce the risk of terrorist attack or seizure of the chemical weapons they transport. Johnston Atoll, though, is the central focus of this study; specifically, the disposal plant.

3. Duration: In Progress (1993 to now)

Although the main focus of this case study is on the site of the Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System, the trans- shipment of chemical weapons held in Germany and other sites exposes other areas to the potential dangers of a chemical weapons leak or accident. This potentially places the entire globe at risk since the routes taken by Army vessels carrying these weapons varies and are highly secretive. The Army maintains tight security to reduce the risk of terrorist attack or seizure of the chemical weapons they transport. Johnston Atoll, though, is the central focus of this study; specifically, the disposal plant.

The Johnston facility, while still in the pilot stage, is incinerating weapons with the hope that all the kinks in the system worked out. If that becomes the case, other facilities in the United States will begin incinerating the rest of the impounded U.S. chemical weapons. Protests to prevent this are still underway in cities where the other facilities are located. Other governments continue to lodge protests against the shipment of these weapons and environmentalists still question the wisdom of incineration as the best means of disposal. One question, though, has been resolved. In April of 1997, the United States Senate authorized the United States involvement among the more than 140 countries of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

4. Location

Continent: Pacific

Region: Southwest Pacific

Country: USA

5. Actors: USA

II. Environment Aspects

6. Type of Environmental Problem: Pollution Sea

Besides the accord signed between the former Soviet Union and the United States, there are other more pressing reasons to dispose of the chemicals. For one, most of the chemical weapons are old. A panel of experts convened by the National Research Council (NRC) has suggested that the government destroy aging and obsolete chemical weapons stored at the eight sites around the country as soon as possible, citing a need to shield nearby populations from the risk of a potentially serious accident. The panel concluded that the United States had done a good job in maintaining the integrity of the weapons but that the age of the weapons has resulted in their deterioration. Some have begun to leak, creating a risk to off-site civilian populations and to those who must work with them. The panel also concluded that the technology needed to ensure safe destruction is now largely in hand, and is unlikely to be much improved upon in the near future.

Others disagree with this sentiment. The issue of malfunctioning incinerators is also of major concern to environmental and other public interest groups. The complexity and variety of the processed involved in the incineration of chemical agents make the prospect of flawless execution dubious. There have already been incidents at the JACADS plant which directly call the plant's execution into question. In January of 1993, a fire broke out in the Explosive Containment Room there, causing the facility to shut down. A cursory glance at the project managers' logs reveals that the JACADS has been plagued by broken meters, clogged burners, faulty circuit breakers, and blocked pipes. In one incident, a small amount of a nerve agent was released during a furnace shutdown, apparently because of improper procedures. Fortunately, the release was well documented by the plants air monitors and the system sent alarms blaring, forcing a thousand workers to don gas masks. In the end, no one was injured and the release did not even warrant reporting because it was such a small quantity.

Another troubling facet of chemical weapons destruction is their international transportation to the Johnston facility. Governments in the South Pacific, namely America Samoa, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Cook Islands, New Zealand, and the government of Hawaii have repeatedly lodged official protests (only to see those protests eventually ignored) with the U.S. government against the transshipment of chemical weapons from other holding sites throughout the world. These governments fear an accidental explosion or leak from these weapons. The prevailng sentiment of the region has been that shipping nerve gas is a foolish gamble with the lives of everyone with the lives of everyone living in the pathway."

Most troubling of all is that even in destroying the weapons, the incineration process will yield emissions that could be highly toxic. It matters little that the quantity of pollutants will be small. The plant will produce significant amounts of dioxins, highly toxic chemical compounds, that work their way into the food chain and accumulate in human tissue. Even those within the federal government, namely the Environmental Protection Agency, have questioned the wisdom of incineration. They maintain that incinerators emit harmful by-products and that these emissions increase when the incinerators malfunction.

7. Type of Habitat: Ocean

8. Act and Harm Sites:

Act Site       Harm Site           Example

USA            Pacific Ocean       Chemicals can reach ocean

III. Conflict Aspects

9. Type of Conflict: Interstate

On one hand, there are protests by environmental groups, like Greenpeace, who do not want to see the demilitarization of these weapons by the Army until such a time that the technology is available to ensure the completely environmentally friendly disposal of these agents. Greenpeace, usually known for its rather active protests, has yet to do more than call attention to the realized and potential environmental degradation that is a result of the incineration of chemical weapons. The extent of Greenpeace's protest is condemnation of the incineration process as unsound environmentally, a conclusion published in a May 1991 report.

10. Level of Conflict: Warharm

Then there are those governments in the South Pacific, namely America Samoa, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Cook Islands, New Zealand, and the government of Hawaii who repeatedly lodged official protests (only to see those protests eventually ignored) with the U.S. government against the transshipment of chemical weapons from other holding sites throughout the world. Again, these protests have been of a civil and diplomatic nature. None of these protests has led to a boycott or other more proactive protestation of American actions regarding their disposal of chemical weapons.

There are also protests being lodged by American citizens within the contiguous 48 states, particularly those citizens around whom a chemical weapons decommissioning facility has been built, that have fought the government in its attempts to dispose of their chemical weapons here at home. The weapons to be destroyed at Johnston are only 7% of the U.S. chemical weapons awaiting disposal. The other 93% are slated for burning at eight military facilities in the continental United States-in Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Oregon, and Utah. In Kentucky, for instance, the state has passed legislation requiring the Army to prove that incineration poses less risk than any alternative method that could be developed - a daunting and most likely impossible task.

American taxpayers have also lodged protests regarding the accord signed between the former Soviet Union and the United States. Because of the economic woes being experienced by the former Soviet Union, the United States will have to give monetary and technical assistance to the Russian government to ensure of the safe disposal of their chemical stockpile. This may ultimately entail footing the bill for the disposal of Russia's chemical weapons. The Russians estimate that the total tab will amount to $10 billion.

The final conflict attempting to be ameliorated by the Russian government is its citizens' protests against the disposal of waste near their places of residence. The government has attempted to offer, as compensation, much needed facility support in the form of housing and financial aid, hospitals and laboratories to struggling workers of the former Soviet Union for assurances that they will accept disposal facilities in their neighborhoods.

11. Fatality Level of Dispute: 0

III. Environment and Conflict Overlap

12. Environment-Conflict Link and Dynamics: Indirect

Environmentalists contend that the Army has not sufficiently considered alternatives to incineration. A report issued by the National Academy of Sciences during the summer of 1993 examined dozens of alternative technologies for destroying the chemical weapons arsenal. The group's research concluded that there are several other technologies that could be used to replace or augment incineration. Two such possibilities are molten metal pyrolysis, in which agents are mixed with a molten metal such as iron, and plasma arc destruction, in which agents are annihilated in the scorching arc between two electrodes.

The Army maintains that destroying these weapons is best accomplished through incineration. After evaluating other techniques, the army opted for high-temperature incineration as the safest and most-effective destruction method. But this decision has been questioned by public interest groups and elected officials of the affected regions, as cost projections for destroying the U.S. stockpile soared from $1.7 billion in 1985 to $7.9 billion in 1992. Greenpeace has argued that the Army should reevaluate alternatives and tailor its program to the differing destruction requirements of the stocks located at different sites - not try to force a one-size-fits-all solution on such a complex task.

Destroying these weapons will yield emissions that could be highly toxic. No one, on either side, disputes this. The plant will produce significant amounts of dioxins, highly toxic chemical compounds. Other governments who have protested the Johnston facility fear that smokestack emissions will contaminate the ocean food chain, thereby working its way into the human food chain as these island nations cultivate their ocean resources. This has caused these nations to lash out against the U.S. plans at Johnston Atoll.

Conflict, though, may also now result because of the Chemical Weapons Convention's guidelines. The articles of the convention outline in detail timetables for the destruction of these weapons. These strict timetables are a consequence of the deteriorating condition of many of the chemical weapons in the U.S.'s arsenal; potentially resulting in an accident with catastrophic consequences. If the United States or the Soviet Union or one of the other signatories of the Convention do not decommission these weapons according to the Convention's timetable, there will be conflict (civil and diplomatic) on a global scale.

13. Level of Strategic Interest: State

14. Outcome of Dispute: Compromise

IV. Related Information and Sources

15. Related ICE Cases

16. Relevant Websites and Literature

Websites

http://www.susx.ac.u k/spru/hsp/cwc.html

http://www.clw. org/pub/clw/clw/cwcchron.html

http://bicc.uni- bonn.de/weapons/brief3/chap3.html

http://www.dtic.dla.mil/defenselink/news/Jan96/b012496_b t024-96.html

http://www.sipri. se/pubs/yb94/!b94ch9.html

http://www-pmcd.apgea.army.mil/csdp/moreinfo/how- will.html

Literature

Brin, Jay. "Handle With Care: The Destruction of Chemical Weapons," Technology Review, vol. 96, April 1993: pp. 36-37.

Cambell, Christy and Matthews, Robert. "The Dregs of the Cold War," World Press Review, vol. 37, September 1990: pp. 16-17.

Gordon, Michael. "Moscow Is Making Little Progress In Disposal of Chemical Weapons," New York Times (Late Edition), December 1, 1993: p. A1+.

Grossman, Daniel; Shulman, Seth. "A Case of Nerves," Discover, vol. 14, November 1993: pp. 66-75.

Isaacs, John. "Arms controllers v. Greenpeace," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, vol. 46, November, 1990: pp. 4-6.

Lord, mary. "A World Away," U.S. News & World Report, vol. 109, November 12, 1990: p. 17.

Meyer, Eugene L. "Toxic Fallout," Audubon, vol. 94, September 10, 1992: pp. 16-20.

Misrach, Myriam Weisang. "Nerve Gas Unnerves Hawaiians," Sierra, vol. 76, March/April 1991: pp. 68-69.

"Nervous About Nerve Gas," Time, vol. 136, August 6, 1990: p. 28.

Peterson, Ivars. "Chemical Weapons Stockpiles: A Burning Question," Science News, vol. 126, December 1, 1984: p. 340.

Shulman, Seth. "Bomb Buring in the Pacific," Technology Review, vol. 93, October 1990: 18-20.

Smith, R. Jeffrey. "NRC Urges Destruction of Chemical Weapons," Science, vol. 226, December 7, 1984: pp. 1174-1175.

Smithson, Amy. "Chemicals Destruction: The Work Begins," The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, vol. 49, April 1993: pp. 38-43.

Smithson, Amy. "Conventional wait," The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, vol. 49, September 1993: pp. 10-11.


November, 1997