The entire basin of the Litani River is located within the borders of Lebanon. The river rises in the central part of the northern Biqa'a Valley, a short distance west of Baalbek and flows between the Lebanon mountain to the west and the anti-Lebanon mountains to the east, running south and southwestardly at its own pace. The river enters a gorge at Qarun, flows through it about 30 kilometers and, near Nabatiya and the Beaufort Castle, abruptly turns right (to the west), to break through the mountain range to the right, and continues to flow through the hilly terrain of the al-Amal region. North of Tyre, it empties into the Mediterranean.
The Litani River flows not far from Israel. The nearest part of the Litani to Israel is where the river turns by Nabatiya, four kilometers from Israel's border. The river's proximity to Israel may make it even more tempting for Israel to exploit. The Litani River is 170 kilometers long, with a basin of 2,290 square kilometers. A narrow ridge about 5 kilometers wide separates the Litani from the Hasbani River, a tributary of the Jordan River.
The Litani discharges approximately 580 million cubic meters (MCM) per year. (This is based on 25 years of measurements, from 1941-1971.) Its flow varies from year to year. The minimum was in 1970 at 184 MCM and the maximum in 1954 at 1020 MCM.(2) The estimated average annual flow of the Litani is 920 MCM.(3) The Litani is smaller than the Jordan in terms of its total flow.(4) The Litani has high quality water. In particular, its salinity level is 20 parts per million (compared with 250-350 parts per million for the Sea of Galilee).(5)
Lebanon finds that the harnessing of the Litani is essential to
its industrial and agricultural development.(6) Therefore, the Litani was
partially dammed at Qarun. The Litani also passes through tunnels and pentstocks
of hydroplants to the coast, where it is used for irrigation for areas
south of Beirut.(7)
If the demand or need for water in the riparian region is much
greater than the supply, conflict over the relatively scarce water to meet
those needs is more likely. This conflict may be military.
In the Israeli-Palestinian context, water is a central ingredient, perhaps only second to land, of the wider conflict between the two sides...the water conflict is not just about water; it reaches to the recesses of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, to questions of land and annexation. Those are abnormal in a water conflict, and render the Israeli-Palestinian water conflict more complex and acute than others in the region.(9)Israel seemingly is tempted to reach beyond its border to get access to the needed water. "Almost half of the water currently used in Israel is captured, diverted or preempted from its neighbors."(10) This is understandable, given water can be described as "Israel's vulnerable and fragile source of life."(11)
Israel is a riparian state, in part meaning that it must share a large portion of its surface water resources with neighboring countries. Control of water may be seen as integral to Israel's sovereignty, the need for which Israel might war over.(12) Historically, Israel has been interested in the Litani, and conflict with Lebanon over the Litani is more likely given this. Essentially, control of the Litani has long been a dream of Israel in hopes of establishing a greater Zion from Sinai to ancient Babylon.(13)
Israel has considered diverting the Litani southward, first proposed in 1905 because it seemed "the waters of the Jordan basin would be insufficient for the future needs of Palestine."(14) The Litani, because of its water, was suggested to become part of the "national Jewish entity" in 1919 but this was rejected by the League of Nations, and the Litani became part of Lebanon.(15)
There were also prestatehood Jewish interests in the Litani. David Ben-Gurion, Israel's first prime minister, suggested the inclusion of the Litani in the Jewish state. The 1941 international commission to whom this was suggested recommended seven-eighths of the Litani be "leased to Israel."(16) Ben-Gurion and Moshe Dayan advocated Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon and the Litani.(17)
In 1945, Professor Lowdermilk proposed a comprehensive water plan for the region which would have included changing the course of the Litani toward the Jordan and used its water for irrigation along the Jordan Valley and in central Eretz Israel (Palestine) where the electricity produced could be transferred to Lebanon. This was never implemented because the Arabs did not want to cooperate with Israel.(18) In 1947, Ben Gurion thought the Litani should be Israel's northern border. Also, water was a source of conflict in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.(19) In fact, in the war in 1967, water resources were "perhaps the prominent factor in Israeli strategic calculations."(20)
After the 1967 war, Moshe Dayan, defense minister, asserted Israel acheived "provisionally satisfying frontiers, with the exception of those with Lebanon."(21)
Israel hoped that it would have use of the Litani by the mid 1980s, when it projected that it would have fully used up the waters captured in the 1967 war. Israel hoped to meet this goal by securing the Litani in 1978. Israel had even included the Litani in calculations of their water resources.(22)
In fact, Israel's need for water makes it conceivable that it
may already be using the Litani. It is not recent that Israel has been
suspected of planning to divert the waters of the Litani for its own use.
Near 1994, this developed into a large number of direct accusations that
Israel was using the Litani.(23)
Israel's significant sources of water are currently exploited, and the only other source is the Litani, which, in order for Israel to use it, would have to be in Israel's possession, which could possibly happen through seizure. The only other source of additional water would be recycled water.(25)
It was hoped that "the roughly 400 MCM would have sufficed for 10, possibly 15, more years of growing water use at the old rates of consumption." This appears not possible any more.(26) Israel seems to be essentially at the limit--or soon will be--of its renewable supplies of water.(27) "It is therefore becoming increasingly evident that the only feasible solution, in terms of water quality, volume, and proximity of the resource, to Israel's growing water problem is to tap a nearby source, namely the Litani River."(28) Also, declining water quality in the form of seawater intrusion into coastal aquifers is a critical issue in Israel.(29) To Israel, therefore, it seems that use of the Litani is the best way to meet its water needs.
Not only this, but also, for reasons of state, Israeli farmers
receive heavy water subsidies, which, according to Elmusa, encourage prolifigate
water consumption and the growing of export crops with huge water appetite;
yet others assert that Israel uses water efficiently for agriculture. Elmusa
also states, "Israelis claim that their country suffers a water stress
that affects its social and economic development. No one would argue that
the region is a water cornucopia. But it is not so obvious that the social
and economic develpment of Israel has been hampered by the lack of water,
not when it has been able to irrigate nearly all of its irrigable land."(30)
"35% of Lebanon's total production of electricity comes from the
Litani waters directly or from the Markaba-Awali diversion." There is a
diversion of 236 MCM annually from the Litani through the Markaba tunnel
to the Awali River, which is used to supply Beirut and other coastal areas
with hydroelectric generation.(33) Lebanon is definitely making use of
the Litani River.
Contributing to the conflicts over water in the Middle East is
"the limited development of technology to improve the supply and management
of resources." This makes "cooperation among states in the region more
difficult as water becomes a source of power and security."(35)
Chaim Weizmann, head of the World Zionist Organization, wrote (around 1919-1920) to Prime Minister David Lloyd George that Lebanon was "well-watered" and that the Litani was "valueless to the territory north of the proposed frontiers. They can be used beneficially in the country much further south." He concluded the Litani was "essential to the future of the Jewish national home.'" Yet the British and French mandate powers kept the Litani entirely in Lebanon.(40)
Returning water-rich western slopes to the West Bank (acquired in the 1967 war), may be seen as relinquishing Israel's water sovereignty and threatening its national existence.(41)
A major reason that Israel gives for its use of the Litani is
that Lebanon is not doing so. As evidence, Israel cites Lebanon's "Litani
Project," of which only a third has markedly been realized. Yet, Lebanon
argues that if it does not have control over its water and land, it will
not be able to realize the potential of its water or land, or use it to
the utmost.
For instance, there is a lack of domestic running water for 22 villages immediately north of the springs where the Litani rises, in the province of Biqa'a. In the south, there are 36 villages which lack domestic running water. It is easy to see that if Lebanon gave Israel the waters of the Litani, opposition from antigovernment forces, especially the fundamentalist movement, would be strengthened, and there would be continued instability in Lebanon.(43) For instance, if Lebanon gave the Litani to Israel and denied the Shia Muslims, who are predominate in the area, use of the water for agriculture and domestic purposes, they would be increasingly frustrated with the Lebanese government. An example of this is that in 1974 there were rumors that water from the Litani were being diverted to Beirut to meet predicted shortages, which caused large anti-governmental demonstrations.(44)
If Lebanon allowed Israeli diversion of the Litani, the economic development of Lebanon would be adversely affected, and groups calling for the cantonization or Islamization of the country would be strengthened. Also, much of southern Lebanon would become desert, and irrigation would be nearly impossible.(45)
A further reason for concern is that for water, "stated in terms
relative to their income level, Palestinians pay a minimum of 15 times
more than Israeli settlers--a phenomenal difference for water systems managed
by the same company."(46) In addition, Elmusa also argues that water stress
is relative, and the Palestinians are much more water stressed than the
Israelis.(47)
The Litani is therefore undeveloped in Lebanon, but it is not
Israel's either. "Israel tried to preserve the waters for itself, once
in 1978 and again in 1982, but failed, the first time because the US administration
under Carter inexplicably balked, and the second time because the local
population in southern Lebanon fought the Israelis to a standstill, no
less surprisingly."(49)
The particular point of concern is where the Litani breaks its southward course and turns west toward the Mediterranean below the Chateau de Beaufort. "This proximity is, in fact, the geopolitical link between the rivers, because Israel had hoped to connect the Litani with the Jordan, thus enabling it to pump those waters, duly blocked, into Israel proper."(52)
Diversion of the Litani was not all that easy for the Israeli planners. In order to facilitate diversion near Beaufort, the river must be managed from central Biqa'a to Beaufort. The entire course of the Litani would need to be controlled to have the necessary water level at the inlet to the tunnel. Also, at the inlet, in order to maintain the suction pressure needed, one or more weirs would be needed to raise the water level. To further complicate things, throughout the seasons, the Litani's flow greatly varies and the result would be too much water at the flooding season and too little water during the dry season. Therefore, the River would need to be controlled from the Biqa'a Valley, which the Israelis would need to occupy in order to do so.(53)
Additionally, much of the Litani flows through a deep gorge and is not only very difficult to manage but for Israel to conquer. Obviously, it isn't simple to use this water for irrigation. In order to use the Litani, one would have to, through civil works, control nearly the whole upper part of the river.(54)
In order to control the needed part of southern Biqa'a, including the valley and its river, Israel would need to control the ridges on both sides of the valley. For this, money was available and technology rudimentary, but it was politically unfeasible. The Shi'ites helped defeat Israel's plan by, in conflict in 1982, successfully resisting Israeli occupation. Geographically and ethnically, the situation was not favorable.
Although Israel still occupies the southeastern corner of Lebanon, it has not completed the major portion of the project. Satellite pictures are unavailable, but eyewitnesses do report evidence of construction. The US and Israel deny this. There is no evidence that water supplies are being increased as a result of diversion from the Litani. Therefore, Stauffer concludes, if there is any diversion, it is small.(55) Soffer (1994) asserts: "Israeli invasions of southern Lebanon (1978, 1982) were a direct result of PLO attacks on Israel, and in no way does Israel control the Litani zone, nor has it ever transferred even one cup of water from Lebanon to Israel."(56)
Zionists long ago claimed the Litani.(57) For example, one case
of downstream preemption is: "Israelis have long considered a scheme for
building a low dam on the Litani and a tunnel connecting it with the Upper
Jordan tributaries in order to pump the waters into Israel proper."(58)
In fact, the occupation of the Golan Heights was a first step toward Israel
securing the Litani by securing its eastern part by the proposed diversion
works.(59) In addition, in the conflict in 1967, Israel wanted more water
than it could get from the war and there are reports that it then started
preliminary engineering work.(60)
1.) Lebanon's fear is that Israel may have already begun diverting the waters of the Litani...There are strong suggestions, although no proof, that Israel may already be siphoning water underground from Lebanon to its northern Galilee settlements. 2.) It was small wonder that the first Israeli diversion plans for the Litani has come into being. 3.) It is widely believed that Israel has diverted water from the Litani river...through a tunnel, thereby delivering Israel an additional 500 MCM annually. This development has, of course, reduced the amount of water available to Lebanese farmers. (61)Given Israel's relatively great need for water, in part due to its large consumption of it, it is conceivable that Israel is taking water from the Litani. There are reports of siphoning water from it to the Jordan River basin, which covers a distance of less than 10 kilometers.(62) There is no concrete evidence of this.
Israel, if it can muster the requisite attitude and political will, is in a position to end the water conflict by ceasing its unilateral taking away of the common water resources and yielding to the Palestinians their fair share in accordance with international water law. Israel would no t suffer appreciable harm or play a zero-sum game. It already possesses greater quantities of water than the Palestinians from its endogenous and other international resources to meet its baseline needs. It also has greater economic and technical capabilities to tap the rich alternative water resources it has. It can considerably gain in the water sector and trade in water-related technologies in the wake of a peaceful settlement.(65)Elmusa also asserts that the Israeli-Palestinian water conflict is complex, and that the key to its resolution is working out an equitable apportionment regime, with possible joint management of the common water resources in accordance with international law. He recommends that "the Palestinians must repossess their endogenous water resources. This is the issue that negotiations must tackle at the outset, if quick progress is to be made."(66)
According to Elmusa, Palestinians are entitled to a much larger share than Israel, much larger than their presently imposed share, because Israel has access to greater quantities from other sources than the ones had in common with the occupied Palestinian territories (OPTs) with which it can satisfy its basic water needs. "It also possesses much larger quantities of, and greater economic and technical capabilities to tap, yet untapped resources...In addition, Israel has a broad sea front on the Mediterranean, which affords it practically limitless amounts of water for desalinization technology, which it sells worldwide."(67)
An argument for Lebanon to exploit the water resources it has in the Litani is that one of the reasons for the economic state of Lebanon is its inability to develop due to lack of water. Water is not only essential to the economic development of Lebanon, it is also vital for its improvement of health and quality of life.(68)
Given the scarce amount of water available, recycling and desalinization may help. If there is a conflict because there is not enough water, a necessary response is to recycle and implement other programs to conserve water. This involves the most efficient use of water, which, according to Lee and Brooks, the Israelis have mastered out of necessity. Maybe Israel could share such technology with the Lebanese and possibly even develop joint projects with them. For instance, the Israelis could assist the Lebanese in the most efficient use of the Litani, which might involve the establishment of a modern water infrastructure in Lebanon. These sorts of confidence building measures are needed.
Much more water is needed to meet demand than water in existence. Increasing the supply without depleting finite ground reserves will be difficult. Desalinization seems the only answer and yet one that is very expensive. Compared to maintaining armies to secure water, desalinization is a less costly alternative. In fact, money could be diverted from the use of the military to secure water, to desalinization and other nonmilitary ways to secure and attain water. If countries develop surpluses, they could sell them, as "Lesotho is selling water to South Africa."(69)
It must be known that desalinization is a possible but expensive recourse to the dearth of water. It would cost about $2.5 billion to desalinize enough water (500-600 MCM) to secure peace, Professor Dan Zaslavsky, Israel's water controller, proposed in 1992.(70)
In conclusion, water security may be the new context for the Arab- Israeli
conflict. This involves solving who may claim and exploit existing water
resources, and in this case, the Litani. As it is now, the Litani is not
of optimal use to Lebanon or Israel because of Israel's occupation of southern
Lebanon.
Region: Mideast Asia
Country: Lebanon
Act Site Harm Site Example Israel Lebanon Plans for diversion of Litani
Right now, Israel and Lebanon both have less water than they need and
want. This has led to conflict over the Litani River. There is also a power
imbalance between these two countries and this contributes to the conflict
as well.
ICE Cases
Literature
Bibliography
November, 1997