2. Description
Succeeding the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, the United Nations Security Council (U.N.S.C.) adopted a series of Resolutions to impose economic sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro, the United Nations Protected Areas (U.N.P.A.s) in Croatia, and those areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina controlled by Bosnian Serbs. In addition to these measures, an arms embargo existed for all the states of the former Yugoslavia.(1) The following is a timeline of those Resolutions adopted by the United Nations Security Council: TIME LINE OF U.N. RESOLUTIONS *United Nations Security Council Resolution (hereafter, U.N.S.C.R.) 713, adopted on September 25, 1991, imposed a complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to all parts of the former Yugoslavia. *U.N.S.C.R. 724 ( December 15, 1991) established a Sanctions Committee to monitor the arms embargo, and requested Member States to report to the Secretary-General on measures taken. *U.N.S.C.R. 757 (May 30, 1992) imposed a wide range of measures effectively severing economic links with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). The Resolution was fourfold. It prevented imports of all commodities and products originating in Serbia and Montenegro. It prevented the sale of commodities and products (other than food and medical supplies notified to the U.N.S.C. Sanctions Committee) to Serbia and Montenegro. It imposed a ban on making funds available to Serbian and Montenegran entities. It banned scientific and technical co-operation; as well as flights to or from Serbia and Montenegro. *U.N.S.C.R. 787 (November 16, 1992) prohibited the shipment of energy supplies, and various commodities through Serbia and Montenegro unless specifically authorized by the U.N.S.C. Sanctions Committee. *U.N.S.C.R. 820 (April 17, 1993) prohibited imports to, exports from, and transshipment of goods through the United Nations Protected Areas in Croatia, and those parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina under the control of Serb forces (unless specifically authorized by the U.N.S.C. Sanctions Committee). Moreover, assets of Yugoslav entities were to be frozen, and the provision of services, both financial and non-financial, for the purposes of business carried on in Yugoslavia was prohibited. Exceptions were made for telecommunications, postal services and certain legal services. Nonetheless, all maritime traffic was prohibited from entering Yugoslavia's territorial sea--except where expressly authorized. * U.N.S.C.R. 942 (September 23, 1994) aimed to prevent the economic activities of and links with Bosnian-Serb entities found in areas under the control of the Bosnian-Serb military. Furthermore, the U.N. froze the assets of these entities and people. The supply of goods and services to any person or body in this area was prohibited, except for the supply of humanitarian aid and goods and services specifically allowed by the U.N.S.C. Sanctions Committee or the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Moreover, the Resolution also called on States to tighten controls on the shipment of goods to the former Yugoslavia--so as to prevent the diversion of goods to those parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina occupied by Bosnian Serb forces. *U.N.S.C.R. 943 (September 23, 1994) suspended the restrictions on international civilian aircraft flights to and from Belgrade's airport. This was a temporary suspension (for a period of 100 days) and was dependent on the Serbian and Montenegran authorities ability to effectively implement their decision to close the Servo-Bosnian border. As a result of the closing of the border, the Secretary-General was asked to report on the blockade's status every 30 days. In the event the Secretary-General reported a breakdown in the blockade, the sanctions would be reimposed within five days. Subsequent U.N.S.C.R.s have renewed the suspension. *U.N.S.C.R. 1015 (September 15 1995) increased the suspension period for sanctions from 100 days to 180 days. EFFECTS OF SANCTIONS ON SERBIAN- MONTENEGRAN TRADE/ECONOMY The sanctions on Serbia-Montenegro were devestating to its industries. Along with destroying Serbia- Montenegro's industrial export markets, sanctions caused severe shortages of imported spare parts and raw materials. An example of sanctions toll can be seen in Serbia's dramatic drop in output and retail sales. In 1993, Serbia's industrial output and retail sales fell by 40 and 70% respectively. Because of the drop in sales caused by sanctions, approximately 60% of the industrial labor force was laid off. An example of the sanctions effects on Serbia's industrial labor force can be seen in the Yugo Motor Company's Zastava plant. The Zastava plant at one point had to lay off almost all of its 15,000 employees.(2) EFFECTS OF THE SANCTIONS ON THE ENVIRONMENT The effects of the U.N. sanctions on the Serbian- Montenegran environment, not unlike the effects of the Greek blockade on the Macedonian environment See Macedon Case , have came in the form of air pollution and deforestation: air pollution caused by the increased use of coal and burning of trees for fuel. Deforestation has not occurred in Serbia-proper itself, but also has occurred in Serbian held bits of Bosnia. Because of the tight oil embargo (an oil embargo in which some oil did slip through the Servo-Montenegran borders), Serbia-Montenegro had to find alternative sources of fuel to heat their houses and create electricity. The oil, which did slip through the borders, was used to fuel military equipment, e.g., tanks and jeeps, in the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Because the oil that did slip through the borders was mostly used to fuel the war effort, Serbs in Serbia-Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina had to find ways to provide fuel for Serbia-proper. Therefore, coal and trees became substitutes for deplete oil resources. The deforestation has caused soil erosion, which places at risk other plant species. Susequently, animals, that rely upon these plants for substinence, could also be placed at risk of extinction. Ergo, the deforestation and soil erosion, caused by the clear cutting of forests in Serbia-Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina, could cause a vicious cycle of environmental destruction. The F.R.Y.'s leader, Slobadon Milosevic, used the economic sanctions both as a glue for defiant nationalist sentiment and to strengthen his hold on power. Milosevic's regime controlled the media in the F.R.Y. and, thereby, Serbs perceptions of the wars in Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The F.R.Y.'s media presentation allowed Serbs in Serbia-Montenegro to share a sense of community and solidarity with their fellow brethren in Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The commonality that Serbs in Serbia-Montenegro felt with Serbs in Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina feed Serbian nationalism.(17) Serbian nationalism then lead to Serbia-Montenegro's implicit support for expansionism in the Balkans. This expansionism eventually led to the forced removal, torture, and genocide of thousands of Muslims and Croats from their purported homes. (Although most of the human rights violations were committed by Serbs against Croats and Muslims, Croats and Muslims also violated Serbs human rights.)(18) EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SANCTIONS ON THE F.R.Y.\ Although the effects of sanctions on Servbia and Montenegro's export market was disastorous (subsequently causing living standards to drop), the sanctions were ineffectual at stopping Serbian expansionism.(3) This was due to a number of reasons that range from product diversification and industrial remodification to smuggling of goods and hard currencies into Serbia-Montenegro. Prior to the breakaway of Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had started its transition from a centrally planned to market economy. These austere economic measures allowed Servo- Montenegran's to more easily adapt to lower living standards, therefore, rendering the harsh living conditions caused by sanctions to be ineffective in causing the Serbs to drop their nationalist pursuits.(4) Moreover, the sanctions failed to effectively collapse the F.R.Y.'s infrastructure. Before the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro's agricultural infrastructure was almost completely self-sufficient. The F.R.Y.'s industrial infrastructure, albeit suffering dearly from sanctions, began to adjust to the effects of sanctions and retool its industries. For example, the Zastava auto industry, once crippled by sanctions and the break up of Yugoslavia, found domestic replacements for all the parts it could no longer import for its Yugo cars, and embarked on an expansion program. According to the FRY's Central Bank Governor, Dragoslav Avramavic, Serbia- Montenegro planned for major investments in the auto industry, telecommunications, public transport, and other sectors.(5) Consumers also made sacrifices and adaptive changes, i.e. import substitutions and domestic diversifications. Such apative changes can be seenn in the Serbian switch from petrol to coal and trees as fuel. Because of these changes, Yugoslavia was--in effect--forced to become a more closed economy, and, therefore, was less likely to feel the effects of the sanctions.(6) Due to the highly porous borders and destitute economies of the countries adjacent to the F.R.Y., Resolutions 757 and 787 failed to stop the flow of oil into Serbia-Montenegro.(7) These reasons also were the cause of the failure of the 'amended' actions by the Department of State and Treasury and European Community since December 1993. The actions called for sanctions assistance missions (S.A.M.s) to set up and give the countries of Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Romania, Ukraine, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia assistance in monitoring the compliance of the sanctions on the Danube river and their land adjacent to the F.R.Y..(8) The problem with the S.A.M.s was it demanded an exorbitant number of people in order to plug both the Danube and adjacent borders: Borders war profiteers and sanction busters used to smuggle goods into the F.R.Y.. Once in place, the S.A.M.S were limited in their success, due to the small number of international monitors placed on it: 135. The small numbers made it clearly impossible to make sure Serbia- Montenegro's border were sealed. Making the borders even more porous was the fact that only 2 spots of the Serbian border were sealed at night, making it easy for sanctions-busters to smuggle goods into Serbia by dark.(9) Because of the F.R.Y.'s porosity, oil smuggling became a very lucrative trade and in some areas surrounding Serbia-Montenegro very easy to do.(10) An example of this highly prosperous trade, was found in Timisoara, Romania. Because Romanian and Serbian customs agents in this sector could easily be bribed, the border was easy to smuggle goods across. Highway E-70 which passes through the area, became an oil and gasoline pipeline. Petrol stations on that stretch of road pumped approximately 21,000 gallons of gas a day into trucks, buses, and cars heading across the border. Proprietors of these petrol stations report Serbian tour buses were outfitted to smuggle up to five tons of gas; and Russian-built Lada's have been retooled to hold up to 525 gallons or 2,000 liters of gas. Sixty liters were stored in the ordinary tank and the rest pored into the contrived tanks found in the trunk, in the door frames, under the seats, and into the gap under the roof. The cars ended up being so full of gas that people pushed them over the border at night, only to push them empty back the next day and start the whole process over again.(11) Not only did these improprieties involving gasoline occur on land, but they also occurred on the Danube River. Under the Danube convention of 1948, the river is considered an international waterway, giving unimpeded passage to ships (and sanctions busters) of all nations. Because of the volumes of ships traversing the Danube, Serbs have even resorted to cruising the Danube awaiting diesel fuel barges to hijack. On occasion, Romanian ships were threatened by Serbian pirates, who said they would sink the ships unless the captain relinquished control of the helm.(12) Such piracy led to an increased probability of an oil spill. Moreover, the sanctions placed on the F.R.Y. were rendered ineffective due to unilateral transfers. Both Serbs and non-Serbs used their entrepreneurial ingenuity to smuggle foreign currencies into Serbia Montenegro. This was accomplished by pickpockets, smugglers, extortionists, drug dealers, and gangsters at work throughout Europe. These thieves and scam artists provided a constant flow of foreign currency into the country, which was vital to the government's effort to support the dinar. As a result, the FRY, according to Interpol agents, became a "Laundromat for 'dirty' money from criminals throughout Europe". An example of which is a racket that Interpol agents broke up in Austria.(13) The illicit scheme involved the theft of cash, travelers checks, and credit cards and the larceny of banks and houses around Europe. In Austria alone, the ring stole $5 million in 6 months. The police on the case believed the cash was either taken directly to Belgrade or used to buy goods that were smuggled into Yugoslavia. If the cash was not taken to Belgrade, then it was taken to Timisoara Romania where dummy corporations were set up to illicitly transfer goods and funds into the F.R.Y..(14) The last element, which may have played a role in stymieing the effectiveness of economic sanctions, was the F.R.Y.'s monetary policies. These policies were set up by a former world bank economist and new governor of the Serbian Central Bank, Dragoslav Avramovic. This plan phased out the dinar and introduced a new currency, the super dinar. Pegged at parity with the Deutsche-mark, the super dinar was made convertible.(12) Use of the new dinar was stimulated by U.N.S.C. Resolution 757 of May 30, 1992, which froze all funds transfers.(15) However, this resolution did not place a ban on interest in dinar accounts. Mr. Avarmovic hoped that by pegging the super dinar to the mark that Serbs would be encouraged enough to begin exchanging their marks and dollars--which they had stuffed for years in mattresses--for the new super dinar. According to F.R.Y. officials, this plan worked. They report foreign exchange reserves rose from 147.4 million marks in January 1994 to 380.4 million marks in August 1994. Albeit one might question these figures, due to their lack of international scrutiny, there was still a strong possibility Dragoslav Avramovic's actions helped stymie the sanctions' effects.(16) Due to the rather convoluted nature of this case, the nation state of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia- Montenegro) was never explicitly in violation of the U.N. Charter or any Geneva Convention's. Sanctions were levied on the F.R.Y., because of its role in helping Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Because of its role, the U.N.S.C. found it in violation of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter. Article 2(4) says, "all U.N. members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial or political independence of any state, or in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the U.N.."(22) Where this application of Article 2(4) gets contentious is in determining if the break away Republics were actual states with international rights. By the time wars broke out in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina's sovereignty had only been recognized by a few states, particularly Germany. (Serbia has been a Century old adversary of Germany's. Their apathy for Serbs is underscored in the slaughter of tens of thousands of Serbs in Catholic Croatia during W.W.II..) The FRY's cadres in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, unlike the FRY, were in direct violation of international law. Bosnian Serbs violated both the Geneva Convention's Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War, Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. They violated the former Convention by forcing people to depart their homes and by forcing civilians to work in labor camps. Serbs also violated Article 53 of that Convention which says, "any destruction by the occupying power of real or personal property belonging to private persons, or to the state or to other public authorities is prohibited, except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations." Clearly the bombing of innocent civilians is not necessary by military operations.(23) The latter of these two Convention's was violated by the Serbs, because they did not grant Croatian and Muslim prisoners-of-war humane treatment. The Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Prisoners-of-War requires the humane treatment of prisoners-of-war. These prisoners "may not be threatened or exposed to any unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind" (24). The war in the Former Yugoslavia erupted over the rights (or lack thereof) of republics within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Croatia, Macedonia, Slovenia, and Bosnia- Herzegovina felt their rights were being encroached upon by Serbia-Montenegro. As a result, they broke away from the F.R.Y. to form their own nations. Economic Sanctions on all products, except for those used for humanitarian reasons. The impact of the embargo on Serbia-Montenegro has been direct, because everyone has suffered--elites and poor alike. However, Serbia-Montenegro has been surprisingly resilient to the effect of sanctions. This is due to a number of reasons that range from import substitution and product diversification to the smuggling goods into the country by both Serbs and non-Serbs. The effects of UN sanctions on the Serbian-Montenegran environment, not unlike the effects of the Greek blockade on the Macedonian environment (See Macedon), have came in the form of air pollution and deforestation. Increased pollutants were caused by the burning of trees and coal for fuel. Because of the tight oil embargo (an oil embargo in which some oil did slip through the Servo-Montenegran borders), Serbia-Montenegro had to find alternative sources of fuel to heat their houses and create electricity. Therefore, coal and trees became substitutes for deplete oil resources. The oil, which did slip through the borders, was used to fuel military equipment, e.g., tanks and jeeps, in the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Substitutes have been found for the products that have been sanctioned. Through factory modifications, Serbia-Montenegro was able to produce products which they were unable to import. To create energy to fuel houses and companies, Serbia- Montenegro had to switch from petrol to coal and lumber. The petrol that did manage to find its ways across the sanctioned borders was mainly used for military purposes. Although Croats, Serbs, and Muslims have lived together for centuries and subsequently share common cultures, the war was driven by the perceived differences between the three groups and subsequent prejudices that arose as a result. Facts that Fueled the Conflict (A) Each ethnic group in the Former Yugoslavia (Muslim, Croat, and Serb) holds a different perspective of its history. (B) The collapse of communism left Yugoslavia free of totalitarian rule and without a political system. The people were now free and able to establish democratic government's; however, their understanding of freedom and the meaning of democracy was innate--not unlike Africa. (C) The coming together of the newly unified Germany caused great fear in Serb dominated Yugoslavia. A few historical accounts to show this point are the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand by a Serbian-nationalist and the slaughter of thousands of Serbs in Krajina (a Serbian held part of Croatia) during WWII by Adolf Hitler, Benito Mussolini, and the Catholic government of Croatia (28). This case involves trans-boundary issues both internally and externally. Internally, trans- boundary problems arise over the international legitimacy of the breakaway states. Externally, trans-boundary problems arise over the willingness and relative ease countries bordering the F.R.Y. have smuggled goods into the F.R.Y..
3. Duration: 1990s
4. Location
Europe/East Europe/Serbia
II. Environment Aspects
6. Type of Environmental Problem: General
7. Type of Habitat: Temperate
8. Act and Harm Sites:
III. Conflict Aspects
9. Type of Conflict: INTRASTATE
10. Level of Conflict: HARM
11. Fatality Level of Dispute: >10
III. Environment and Conflict Overlap
12. Environment-Conflict Link and Dynamics: INDIRECT
13. Level of Strategic Interest: STATE
14. Outcome of Dispute: lOSS
IV. Related Information and Sources
15. Related ICE Cases
BLUENILE Case
LITANI Case
CAUVERY Case
JORDAN River Case
NILE River Case